Business & Deals / M&A and Restructuring

Getty Images: How a tabindex="-1" Billion Revenue Business Went Bankrupt

Getty Images had record revenue in 2025, but debt from a failed merger has pushed it into Chapter 11 and left public shareholders with nothing.

Getty Images: How a  tabindex=

Getty Images entered public markets again in 2022 via a SPAC deal that valued the business at about $4.8 billion. Just 4 years later, Getty has now filed for bankruptcy, with existing public shareholders getting nothing. This is a more than a little surprising as Getty announced $981.3 million in revenue in 2025, the highest ever in its 30-year history. How can a business that earns nearly tabindex="-1" billion per year in revenue find itself in the position of handing its ownership to its founding family and a private equity shop? The answer lies in its balance sheet rather than the business’ operations itself.

How a merger changed everything

Getty’s financial difficulties became more apparent after it announced plans to merge with Shutterstock in January 2025. The $3.7 billion transaction was expected to generate tabindex="-1"50 million to $200 million in annual cost savings by its third year. For Getty, this offered an opportunity to strengthen cash generation and reduce its substantial debt.

The US Department of Justice approved the deal in February 2026, but the UK’s Competition and Markets Authority approved it only if Shutterstock divest its global editorial business. Getty rejected and abandoned the deal in July.

The timing was particularly unfortunate. Getty had already raised expensive financing for the acquisition, including secured notes carrying a 10.5% interest rate. When the merger collapsed, the company was left with the costlier 11.25% and 14% debt it had taken on to prepare for the deal, without the expected benefits. By October, Getty had agreed to a restructuring and filed for prepackaged Chapter 11 bankruptcy.

A successful company with an inadequate balance sheet

Getty’s underlying business was actually performing far better than its financial position suggested. Getty earned revenue of $981.3 million and adjusted EBITDA of $320.9 million in 2025, representing a 32.7% margin. EBITDA less capital expenditures was also $261.3 million, meaning the company was still able to generate significant cashflow even after investing in its operations.

type: hbar
title: Getty’s 2025 financial performance
subtitle: Millions of US dollars, full year 2025
source: Getty Images full-year 2025 results
prefix: $
suffix: m
decimals: 1
ymin: 0
---
Metric (2025),$ million
Revenue,981.3
Adjusted EBITDA,320.9
Adjusted EBITDA less CapEx,261.3

However, there were a few worries. Management forecasted 2026 adjusted EBITDA of $279 million to $295 million (later withdrawn), partly because about $40 million of multi-year licensing revenue had been recognized earlier than usual in Q4 2025. Still, annual subscriptions accounted for 57.4% of its first-quarter revenue, indicating that Getty had a strong recurring revenue base

The issue with it was its debt. At the time of filing, Getty had about tabindex="-1".46 billion of debt, with annual debt service costs reaching $239 million. Using its trailing twelve-month adjusted EBITDA, $307 million, this represented approximately 4.7 times EBITDA.

Simply put, Getty was generating only tabindex="-1".28 in EBITDA for every dollar of debt service. Assuming approximately $60 million in annual capital expenditure, based on 2025 results, only $8 million would remain after debt service and capital expenditure, before taxes and working capital changes.

type: stacked
title: Where Getty’s cash profit went before the restructuring
subtitle: Trailing twelve-month adjusted EBITDA of $307 million, millions of US dollars
source: Getty Images disclosure statement and full-year 2025 results
note: Capital expenditures estimated from 2025 results. Debt service includes interest and required principal repayments.
prefix: $
suffix: m
highlight: Debt service
ref: 307 | Adjusted EBITDA
---
Category,Capital expenditures,Debt service,Remaining before taxes
Before restructuring,60,239,8

This meant that there was very little room for any unexpected costs. In Q2 2026, Getty reported negative free cash flow tabindex="-1"22.6m, which included tabindex="-1"10.9m of warrant litigation payments. Its cash balance had sunk to a mere $51.6m as at 30 June. Getty was still turning a profit on its operations, but debt, interest and legal costs whittled away at its liquidity.

Should Getty have walked away from Shutterstock?

I think it was wrong of Getty to abandon the merger, though the CMA’s first condition was not unreasonable. The sale of the editorial business of Shutterstock would have reduced the combined company’s product offering and set up another competitor able to take on Getty.

However, tabindex="-1"50-200 million of annual savings represented a huge opportunity. For a company with nearly five times debt to EBITDA ratio, additional cash generation could have made a meaningful difference.

Getty was correct to focus on the long-term strategic implications, but the company’s immediate financial position made the merger even more valuable. Even a smaller deal with less strategic value might have been better than staying independent with high-cost debt and no obvious way to repay it. In ending the deal, Getty preserved part of its business at the cost of its best chance to right its balance sheet.

Who benefits from the restructuring?

Under the restructuring agreement, the Getty family and Koch Equity Development (a private equity shop) will own 100% of the reorganized entity. Secured creditors will swap their existing debt for new debt that have lower rates of interest and longer maturity, without accepting a reduction in the principal amount. Unsecured noteholders will receive approximately tabindex="-1"70.2 million in cash in exchange for retiring $270 million of outstanding notes.

type: hbar
title: What each group recovers under the restructuring
subtitle: Cents recovered per dollar held
source: Getty Images Form 8-K and disclosure statement
note: Secured creditors keep their principal in new debt with lower rates and longer maturities. The Getty family and Koch receive 100% of the reorganized company.
suffix: ¢
---
Stakeholder,Cents per dollar
Secured creditors,100
Unsecured noteholders,63
Public shareholders,0

Public shareholders will receive nothing and their existing shares will be canceled. This reflects a more general principal that creditors get usually have priority over equity holders when a company is unable to meet its debt obligations.

However, the more controversial part of this agreement is that is existing shareholders, the Getty family and Koch, end up as owners of the entire business and public investors walk away empty handed. This raises questions about whether other investors had a sufficiently competitive opportunity to participate.

The Supreme Court in 1999 in Bank of America v. 203 North LaSalle Street Partnership considered a situation where current owners obtained new equity as part of a reorganization by infusing new capital. The decision emphasized the need to put that opportunity out for the market to test rather than hold it back for current owners.

Getty says Guggenheim Securities led the financing process, and the high level of creditor approval is evidence of its competitiveness. Still, whether the process was competitive enough is worth questioning. While the restructuring is efficient for the business, that doesn’t mean it’s fair to all stakeholders.

Can Getty survive the AI revolution?

Getty faces another major challenge beyond its debt. The rise of generative AI means that customers no longer need to pay Getty for images, and the technology has enabled them to generate images without resorting to traditional stock photography.

However, Getty has has access to something that AI can’t fully replicate: its established relationships with photographers and newsrooms, which allows it to provide real-time editorial coverage. Getty has even started licensing its images to AI developers, creating a new opportunity from the technology that threatened its traditional business.

I think its best bet is editorial photography. An AI-generated image does not serve as substitute to a photograph of a real event, so as synthetic imagery becomes more prevalent, verified and legally licensed material might become more sought after. However, it’s still unclear if it can make up for diminishing demand for traditional stock photos.

The bigger lesson for dealmakers

Getty’s restructuring is ultimately about preserving a business that still generates strong revenue but can no longer comfortably service its debt. Its bankruptcy is less a story of obsolescence and more of a warning of what occurs when an acquisition is financed before all the regulatory approval is in place.

The takeaway for dealmakers is that transaction risk isn’t suddenly mitigated once financing has been secured or both companies have signed a deal. When the merger collapsed, Getty was left with the bill but none of the expected benefits.

Getty didn’t have a business that needed saving. It had a balance sheet that couldn’t afford a deal that didn’t happen.